Stuart Wilkes Nobody has commented on the position of the United States during this period. If the U.S.A. had joined England and France this was would have stiffened everybody's backbone even if it would have taken sometime for the U.S.A. to rearm. There is some indication that FDR might have done it except he would not have the support of congress and might have been impeached. Isolationism was still U.S.A. policy. Peter

So did the Finnish government get Western pressure such as this to give in to the demands made upon them?  No.  The British Ambassador in Helsinki advised the Finnish government to resist Soviet demands, Yes, but you shouldn´t make any leaps from that. Janne Glad

Is there any indication of the vigor and enthusiasm with which the Finnish Armed Forces prosecuted this war [against Germany in 1944-1945]? The purpose of this question escapes me somewhat, and I'd think that terms such as vigour and enthusiasm would be rather out of place in these kind of discussions. I'm pretty sure that very few people were terribly enthusiastic to prosecute a war even in 1939-1940, but since there was precious little choice left in the matter, the task was undertaken. The same was the case in 1944-1945. As for vigour , well, after five years of fighting against Soviet Union, anyone would be a little tired and lacking vigour, and by 1944-1945, it's certainly true that no one was interested in ending up as the last Finnish casualty of the Second World War. Anyhow, to answer the question; since the conditions of the armistice with the USSR specifically required that the German forces were to be driven away from northern Finland, the Finnish Army consequently made its best effort to show to the Soviets that it was quite serious in pursuing this goal. The hostilities in the North were opened with a landing at Tornio, which has been described as a rather reckless and foolhardy action by the veterans who participated in it. The withdrawing Germans were also chased relentlessly all the way to the Norwegian border, and the pursuing Finnish troops ended up experiencing higher casualties than their retreating enemy, mostly because the Germans had mined the territory and the roads pretty thoroughly. The scorched-earth tactics practiced by the Germans everywhere in northern Finland also effectively destroyed whatever little sympathy there may have remained for the former cobelligerents, and increased the bitterness and determination of the Finnish soldiers who fought on the campaign. The Finnish Armed Forces also beat back the so-called operation Tanne Ost , the attempted German invasion of the island of Suursaari on the Gulf of Finland. In this case, the Finnish Army defended territory which had already been de facto ceded to the USSR. And lastly, the Finnish Navy participated in mine-clearing operations on the Baltic in cooperation together with the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The Soviet naval commanders actually expressed their respect towards the competence which the Finnish Navy showed in this task. In short: the Lappland War of 1944-1945 was prosecuted more or less just as determinedly as the previous two conflicts. Less determinedly than the one in 1939-1940, because this time around, national independence was not at stake, but more determinedly than, say, the static defence period of the Continuation War in 1941-1944. Cheers, Jalonen

Well, if we apply this criteria, then Romania, Bulgaria and even Hungary also did not capitulate, but negotiated armistice instead. Bulgaria being an amusing case in which a country that had never declared war nor participated in war against another country (IIRC) still gets to capitulate (or whatever). My set of criteria for negotiated armistice would have to exclude occupation, forced change of government and other such classic features , and my beef here is that using the same word for all situations here blurs quite essential differences (which do exist, despite Finland capitulating to Soviet demands ), not so much that it fails to pay respect to the magnificent feat of the Finnish Army (or some such claptrap). Janne Glad

Well, if we apply this criteria, then Romania, Bulgaria and even Hungary also did not capitulate, but negotiated armistice instead. Hungary attempted to negotiate an armistice, but failed, and was occupied by Germany, so that comparison is a bad one. Bulgaria had not even declared war against the Soviet Union in the first place, and had not commenced any real hostilities against the Red Army after the Kremlin had declared war on them, so that comparison is even worse. But yes, Bulgaria signed an armistice at the time when the country was already occupied by the Red Army and had experienced a regime change. Nothing like this took place in Finland. Romania, on the other hand, surrendered in every sense of the word. The country was occupied, the Romanian Army disarmed and dispersed, and the Soviets also collected the material which the Romanians had captured from them during the war, and used it to equip new Romanian military units which fought under direct Soviet command. Once again, nothing like this happened in Finland. Cheers, Jalonen

And Czechoslovakia on 1938 could also rely on the opposition and hostility of every other European Great Power, if they chose to defy the Anglo-French- Italian-German dictate. Something Finland never faced in 1939. One would think that in a situation where the Czechoslovak government could have counted on the assistance of the largest and most militarily powerful country in the World, any potential hostility even from all these four powers combined should have appeared as a rather trivial risk. As for the comparison with Finland... In 1938, Czechoslovakia was served with threats from Germany, cold shoulder from the Western Powers, and support from the USSR. In 1939, Finland was served with threats from the USSR, cold shoulder from Germany, and support mostly from Sweden and Italy. I don't see any real differences in these predicaments which would explain why Czechoslovakia absolutely _had_ to surrender back in 1939. Unless, of course, their government seriously believed that Hitler would not make any further demands, which is certainly a perfectly acceptable reason. Even the Finnish government was naïve enough to believe in the fundamental sanctity of the international law as late as in the autumn of '39, so in that sense, it can certainly be argued that the governments of both countries made a bad judgement... By the way, this was my last contribution to this thread. Cheers, Jalonen