Mobilizing the Army Guard http://www.afji.com/2008/09/3651732 By Lt. Col. Erich Randall Since Sept. 11, 2001, the Army National Guard has called more than 400,000 soldiers to active duty to support operational requirements relating to the war on terrorism. These demands have furthered the Guard’s transformation from a traditional strategic reserve to an operational reserve. Such large-scale mobilizations have brought to light several significant concerns about the mobilization process, solutions for which are being actively sought and may be resolved by the Army over time and budget cycles. Unfortunately, time is not a luxury that the Army has regarding the problems associated with mobilizing Guard units. Concerns exist that must be resolved sooner than the more overarching problems associated with the transition to an operational reserve. Therefore, a bridging strategy is proposed that will make some of these necessary and immediate fixes to the mobilization problems facing the Army Guard today. This strategy is to provide the Guard a division-level sector in Iraq where all Army Guard units would deploy. This proposal would give the Guard full command and control over their battlespace, to include identifying rotational units, all missions within their area of operations, and managing theater-provided equipment in the sector. The National Guard is unique to the U.S. armed forces in that it has dual missions — federal and state — under the provisions of _title_s 10 and 32 of U.S. Code, respectively. The National Guard has historically been up to both tasks. No matter what the crisis, the citizen-soldiers of the National Guard have responded. This response is critical because the Army is now utilizing and employing the Guard as part of its operational fighting force. The Guard is no longer called to duty strictly as a last resort. Further, this change to an operational reserve is reflected in updated war plans and force flow models. Many of the more than 400,000 Guard soldiers mobilized for duty in the war on terrorism have servedmultiple tours of duty. There is little doubt that this force has been taxed — however, there is even less doubt that these soldiers have answered their nation’s call with honor and faced the enemies of America with the same steely eyed intensity of their active Army counterparts. In 2005-06, concern arose among policymakers questioning the Guard’s ability to withstand further mobilizations. To help forestall what was rapidly approaching an over-reliance on the Army Guard, and indeed, all of the U.S. military’s reserve components, the defense secretary changed the mobilization policy of the Reserve Forces and made six key changes to Defense Department policy. This new policy marked a significant turning point in the forming of an operational reserve force and included establishing the length of involuntary mobilization at a maximum of 12 months; mobilizing ground forces on a unit basis rather than as individual replacements; establishing a planning _object_ive or goal to achieve a ratio of one-year mobilization followed by five years of “dwell time” (time not mobilized) for Reserve forces; and establishing a new program to compensate or incentivize active and reserve members who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or who are extended beyond established rotation policy goals. More than a year has passed, and the time has come to stop and reflect on this significant shift in policy. There is little doubt that the policy solved some very significant problems, but in solving a problem, others are typically created. Such is the case with the 12-month mobilization policy. For example, this policy has a significant and adverse impact upon normal force flow rotations for Operation Iraqi Freedom because the roughly nine-month Army Guard unit rotations of boots on the ground (BOG) do not synchronize with active component 12- to 15-month unit rotations. This creates a need for more Guard brigade combat teams (BCTs) being required to deploy than their active counterparts over the same period of time. This problem is referred to as “incompatible BOG time.” Before the defense secretary’s memorandum, a typical reserve deployment for Iraq was 12 months of BOG time — time that soldiers actually spent in the theater of war. This 12 months, when combined with the traditional three to five months of post-mobilization training and an additional three to four weeks of demobilization, added up to the reservist being activated for about 16 to 18 months. This leaves only six months left on the soldier’s 24-month cumulative “mobilization clock” — not enough time to be of value to the theater commander. This problem of incompatible BOG time is compounded in the Guard. Though 350,000 strong, the Army Guard is a unit-centric organization. National Guard leaders across the country prefer to mobilize an entire unit, not individual soldiers, a policy affirmed in the defense secretary’s memo. This allows for, among other benefits, some level of predictability for the soldiers, families and employers. Therefore, to utilize a Guard soldier for that last four to six months of the 24 allowed, units would need to be brought on for this short time_frame_ — clearly an impractical thing to do. This reality was one of the most significant driving factors for the development of the new mobilization policy because it allows for two 12-month mobilizations instead of one roughly 18-month mobilization. Time